17 September 2024
The European Union’s Foreign Subsidies Regulation (FSR), applicable since 12 July 2023, introduces a new regime aimed at combating actual and potential distortions of competition within the EU internal market caused by foreign subsidies. The FSR aims to ensure a level playing field, closing the regulatory gap between foreign subsidies (which were previously unaddressed) and subsidies granted by Member States (which are subject to EU State aid rules).
The FSR, which empowers the European Commission to investigate potential distortive foreign subsidies, distinguishes between two main categories of procedures which require an ex ante notification:
This newsletter focuses on the notification obligation for M&A operations.
For concentrations, a notification is required under FSR (and subject to standstill) when the following cumulative thresholds are met:
and
These contributions are considered on a group-wide basis. All contributions within the last three years preceding the conclusion of the agreement, counted from the date of entitlement (not of receipt), must be included to determine if the notification threshold is met, regardless of whether all details of these contributions must be reported (see below). In most instances, the FSR procedure will run parallel to a merger procedure in the context of EU merger control – although each procedure will be handled by a different case team.
The European Commission encourages pre-notification discussions to ensure all necessary information is provided and avoid a declaration of incompleteness.
After submitting a complete notification, a period of 25 working days begins, during which the Commission conducts its preliminary assessment, and during which the notified concentration cannot be implemented.
For transactions that do not trigger specific issues, the expected schedule of clearance should approximately be in the range of 5 to 9 weeks, depending on the length of the pre-notification stage (see timeline below). Typically, the Commission clears the transaction by allowing the standstill period to expire without taking any action. The expected timeline is as follows:
For more problematic transactions giving rise to an in-depth investigation, the time required until a decision is issued can be up to 7 months[1]. After opening an in-depth investigation, the Commission has 90 working days to reach a decision, which can be extended by 15 working days if commitments are offered by the notifier. Additionally, the investigation period can be further extended (up to 20 working days) either upon request from the notifier, or by the Commission with the notifier's agreement. Moreover, the Commission has the power to suspend the procedure indefinitely (“stop the clock”) if the notifier fails to deliver the complete information required. The expected timeline (without suspension) is as follows:
The timelines for Phase 1 (25 days) and Phase 2 (90 days) investigations in merger control overlap in principle with the timeline of an FSR investigation. However, this does not necessarily mean that both procedures will progress at the same speed. A parallel track would depend on the simultaneous filing of both the merger and FSR notifications, which may be impractical and, in any case, unnecessary:
In general, parties can and should expect divergences in the timeline between the merger control and FSR procedures as a baseline scenario. Given such a risk of divergences, parties should anticipate and prepare accordingly by determining which procedure is most likely to raise concerns or take longer and factoring this in transaction documentation.
The notification form for a concentration must include the following information:
Experience shows that companies may struggle to gather within a short timeframe up-to-date information concerning FFCs received. This difficulty often arises because such information is not typically maintained at the parent company level, especially when it must be collected from subsidiaries or joint ventures outside the EU.
To avoid difficulties during a projected transaction, it is recommended to set up internal policies to ensure that information on FFCs is consistently collected and reported to the parent company, with appropriate granularity (country, type and purpose of the of FFC, amount, date on which the FFC was granted, etc.). Records should be kept up to date.
The concept of FFC is very broad – it includes various financial contributions that can be granted through either public or private entities, provided they can be can be attributed to the third country. Companies should therefore be wary of gathering inaccurate information, which may in turn affect both the calculation of the threshold as well as the accuracy of the notification form.
To ensure that FSR thresholds are accurately calculated and all relevant FFCs are accounted for, it is recommended to develop appropriate guidelines (at Group level) to correctly identify and report FFCs.
The notification should include:
FFCs most likely to distort the internal market include:
FFCs not exceeding EUR 4 million over three years are generally unlikely to be considered distortive.
This overview includes the purpose of each FFC and the granting entities, along with the quantification in ranges of estimated aggregate FFCs from each third country in the preceding three years.
Notifiers are to make a full and accurate disclosure to the European Commission of the relevant facts for taking a decision on the notified concentration; but certain information may be omitted from the notification form.
This concerns in particular information that is not reasonably available to the parties or information that is not necessary for the Commission’s examination of the case. In such cases, a waiver request should be submitted to the Commission and discussed with the case team in the course of pre-notification.
In addition, the notification form does not have to include information on:
Although such information may be omitted from the form, companies should still ensure that the collection of information is comprehensive, in case the Commission requests additional information in the course of the prenotification.
Although there is an exemption for FFCs granted to other investment funds or their portfolio companies managed by the same AIFM, complexities remain for fund managers’ compliance with FSR. In particular, this exemption is conditional on the majority of investors being different between the funds, which may not always be easily determined, especially with indirect investments through feeder vehicles. The FSR regime may also require data collection across other funds and portfolio companies. Therefore, it is advisable for investment funds and managers to pay particular attention to FSR compliance, and to establish protocols so as to ensure the relevant information is promptly reported and avoid delays during filing.
Failure to comply with the notification obligation or the standstill can result in sanctions of up to 10% of the aggregate turnover of the undertaking in the preceding financial year.
Incorrect or misleading information can result in fines of up to 1% of aggregate turnover and periodic penalty payments.
Alongside antitrust notification obligations and those related to the control of foreign investments, the control of M&A operations established by the FSR is a new constraint that foreign investors must now fully understand and take into consideration.
[1] As of now, there has only been one FSR in-depth investigation (pending).