Analysis & trends

The Growing Trend of Resource Nationalism-based Disputes in Africa – How to Mitigate Risks?

Nearly a third of global mineral reserves are in Africa.[1] Whilst the  African mining sector is often associated with diamonds and precious metals, such as gold, it is the continent’s abundance of critical energy transition minerals that will shape its future. The production of these minerals will be key to the world’s transition to renewable energy and green technologies. It also has the potential to greatly accelerate economic development in Africa.[2]

In parallel to African governments uniting their ambition to develop green projects,[3] there has been a rising trend of African states taking action to increase their control of mining activities and related profits.  This movement, which has been described as “resource nationalism”,[4] manifests itself in the various measures taken by countries such as Tanzania, the Democratic Republic of Congo (“DRC“), and more recently Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. In these important hubs for natural resources, each government has introduced new mining laws,[5] coinciding with their respective military coups.[6]

This development has inevitably created tensions with foreign mining investors, who argue that their rights with respect to their investment in the host African state have been affected under the applicable investment treaty and/or contract. As a result, there has been a sharp increase in international arbitration between mining investors and African states or state entities.

In the last six months alone, the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”) has registered eight such disputes against African states,[7] half of which are against Niger.

Similar disputes may emerge in Senegal, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Botswana or Uganda following their respective recent mining legislation reforms.[8]

In this context, exacerbated by the current global political turmoil and wave of protectionism, it is crucial for both foreign investors and states to review existing international investment agreements (“IIAs”) and contracts to prevent future disputes costing millions, if not billions of dollars to all affected parties.

 

What are “critical energy transition minerals” and where are they found?

The United Nations Environmental Programme defines critical energy transition, or ‘green’, minerals as “naturally occurring substances, often found in rocks, that are ideal for use in renewable technology”.[9]

For instance:

  • Lithium, manganese and cobalt are used in the manufacture of electric vehicle batteries; and
  • Chromium, bauxite and rare earths are essential for the production of wind turbines and solar panels.[10]

Africa holds significant global reserves of these minerals:

  • 48% of the world’s cobalt is found in the DRC; and
  • Nearly 50% of the world’s manganese is concentrated in Africa, with the largest reserves located in South Africa.[11]

 

What is resource nationalism, why is it happening and why is it causing investor-state disputes?

Resource nationalism can be defined as “the assertion of control by a government over its country’s mineral wealth (notably critical minerals, rare earth elements…) and other natural resources for strategic and economic reasons”.[12]

Resource nationalism may manifest itself through a variety of state actions including:

  • Seizure of mining facilities, equipment and resources belonging to foreign investors;
  • Revocation of mining licences;
  • Increases in mining taxes and royalties; and
  • Any other legislative reforms directly or indirectly affecting existing investments.

Since 2014, 31 African countries have reformed their mining codes to increase the participation of governments and local communities in the exploitation of resources.[13]

These reforms include:

  • Obligations to treat and process minerals locally before export;[14]
  • Stricter environmental and Corporate Social Responsibility (“CSR“);[15] and
  • An increase in mining royalties.[16]

Some of these reforms have led to investment arbitration proceedings, notably against Tanzania and the DRC.[17] Tanzania is currently facing three arbitration proceedings, two of which are ongoing, while the third has reportedly been settled. The DRC is involved in three similar arbitration proceedings, all ongoing, two of which were initiated between 2023 and 2025.[18]

These tensions arise when state actions prejudice the rights of foreign investors to whom the state has made commitments under investment contracts or IIAs.

When contracting with investors, states often commit to guaranteeing stable investment conditions for a specified duration through a stabilisation clause. The application of new legislation to beneficiaries of a stabilisation clause, or the revocation of an investor’s mining licence on the basis of failure to comply with new legislation, may in this context constitute a violation of the investment contract and lead to the initiation of arbitral proceedings by the investor in accordance with the contract’s dispute resolution provision.[19]

Similarly, such measures could be considered an unlawful expropriation or a breach of the standard of fair and equitable treatment (“FET“), protections guaranteed by most bilateral investment treaties (“BIT“), opening the way for recourse before an international arbitral tribunal in relation to potential claims for compensation for losses suffered, or even lost profits.[20]

 

How to prevent future mining disputes?

It is in the interest of both foreign investors and states to prevent disputes related to mining projects in particular which, if not managed properly, may cost millions, if not billions to the parties involved.

Disputes with foreign mining investors risk deterring future investments at a time of radical reform of the continent’s infrastructure and energy sector.[21]

To encourage foreign investments, African states must strike a delicate balance between economic sovereignty and investment attractiveness. Foreign investors should maintain sustainable and amicable relations with host states. Failing to do so may have a long-term damaging impact on the future prospects of investments in the host state.

In the event of a dispute, it is often preferable to explore alternatives disputes resolution (“ADR“) mechanisms. In addition to international arbitration, the parties could consider:

  • expert appraisal proceedings, to settle specific technical issues;[22]
  • mediation, which facilitates an amicable settlement;[23] or
  • conciliation, in particular through ICSID, which aims at reaching a compromise acceptable to both parties.[24]

Conscious of the benefits of such procedures, a number of African states have undergone legislative and institutional reforms to promote ADR. For example, several African states have signed the Singapore Convention on Mediation, which “provides a harmonised framework for the enforcement and invocation of international settlement agreements resulting from mediation”.[25]

In parallel, a number of states have also established governmental bodies for dispute prevention and management in an attempt to deter investors from arbitrating disputes.[26]

Amicable settlement procedures and/or engaging with the state in preventative action should therefore be seriously considered by investors who wish to preserve business relationships with states and reap the benefits of Africa’s mineral reserves.

A careful review and, where necessary, renegotiation of existing commitments under investment contracts and IIAs must also be conducted. Thorough, clearly-drafted substantive provisions addressing both investor and state rights (and exceptions thereto), as well as detailed procedural clauses outlining dispute management, prevention and settlement procedures, can assist all parties in the avoidance of timely and costly disputes. This will also ensure that investors and states benefit from more collaborative, sustainable and fruitful investment relationships for years to come.

A review of existing investment treaties and mining contracts is essential. A total of 910 bilateral investment treaties have been signed by African states, out of which 548 are still in force, the majority of which have been signed more than two decades ago.[27] These ‘old-generation treaties’ contain several wide-reaching investor protections with little rights for African states. In the absence of reform, disputes will continue to rise on the Continent.

 

How can we help?

Our dedicated team of dispute resolution lawyers, based across our offices in Paris, London, and in Africa, have decades of experience aiding both foreign investors in Africa and African states to prevent or settle international disputes arising out of mining projects. We act in arbitration proceedings, mediations, renegotiations of contracts and treaties and other ADR procedures.

We are committed to defend the best interests of our clients by optimising their investment and risk management strategies on the African continent.

 


 

[1] United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (“UNECA”), Africa’s critical mineral resources, a boom for intra-African trade and regional integration, 22 December 2024, available at: https://www.uneca.org/stories/africa%E2%80%99s-critical-mineral-resources%2C-a-boon-for-intra-african-trade-and-regional-integration#:~:text=Africa%20is%20home%20to%20significant,ore%20globally%2C%20according%20to%20UNCTAD; United Nations Trade and Development (“UNCTAD”), Economic Development in Africa Report 2023, 16 August 2023, available at: https://unctad.org/publication/economic-development-africa-report-2023.
[2] Ibid.
[3] For details on six greenfield megaprojects valued at more than $5 billion, see UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2024, Regional Trends: Africa, p. 2, available at: https://unctad.org/system/files/non-official-document/wir2024-regional_trends_africa_en.pdf.
[4] Financial Times, Resource Nationalism on the Rise, 12 December 2024, available at: https://www.ft.com/content/14dad9e1-bfda-4c00-b1b6-9dd41842650a.
[5] Chris Ewokor, BBC News, Three military-run states leave West African bloc – what will change?, 29 January 2025, available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c5yvd91j72eo; African Mining Legislation Atlas, available at: https://www.a-mla.org/en (last accessed 28 February 2025): Burkina Faso Mining Code 2024; Mali Local Content Act 2023; Niger Mining Code 2022.
[6] These three states have also recently left the Economic Community of West African States (“ECOWAS”).
[7] ICSID Cases Database, available at: https://icsid.worldbank.org/cases/case-database (last accessed 28 February 2025). The eight disputes are: Minas de Revuboè Limitada v. Republic of Mozambique (ICSID Case No. ARB/24/40); Alain Francois V. Goetz and Aldabra Limited v. Republic of Rwanda (ICSID Case No. ARB/24/48); Sarama Resources Ltd v. Burkina Faso (ICSID Case No. ARB/24/51); Minerali Industriali SRL v. Republic of Tunisia (ICSID Case No. ARB/24/52); GoviEx Niger Holdings Ltd. and GoviEx Uranium Inc. v. Republic of Niger (ICSID Case No. ARB/25/1); Société des Mines de Loulo S.A. and Société des Mines de Gounkoto S.A. v. Republic of Mali (ICSID Case No. ARB/25/2); Ngondo Mining SARL v. Democratic Republic of the Congo (ICSID Case No. ARB/25/3); Orano Mining SAS v. Republic of Niger (ICISD Case ARB/25/8);  Orano Mining SAS v. Republic of Niger (ICISD Case ARB/25/8).
[8] See Senegal Mining Code 2016, under which the state is entitled to acquire for consideration additional shares in mining companies up to 25% of the share capital; Zambia Mines and Minerals Development Act (amended 2022), which enables the state to acquire and retain interest in mining licences; Uganda Mines and Minerals Act 2022, which allows the government to take a compulsory 15% free-carry stake in all mining operations; Zimbabwe Mines and Minerals Act (amended by Finance Act 2023), which introduces new conditions for “strategic minerals“; and Botswana Mines and Minerals Act (proposed amendments 2024), which aims to increase local ownership in mining projects.
Information from African Mining Legislation Atlas, available at: https://www.a-mla.org/en (last accessed 28 February 2025).
[9] United Nations Environment Programme (“UNEP”), What are energy transition minerals and how can they unlock the clean energy age?, 19 February 2024, available at: https://www.unep.org/news-and-stories/story/what-are-energy-transition-minerals-and-how-can-they-unlock-clean-energy-age.
[10] Ibid.; UNCTAD, Economic Development in Africa Report 2023, 16 August 2023, available at: https://unctad.org/publication/economic-development-africa-report-2023.
[11] UNCTAD, Economic Development in Africa Report 2023, 16 August 2023, available at: https://unctad.org/publication/economic-development-africa-report-2023.
[12] Thomson Reuters Practical Law Glossary, Resource Nationalism, available at https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/Glossary/PracticalLaw/I60ed0426178811ef8921fbef1a541940?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&firstPage=true (last accessed 28 February 2025)
[13] African Mining Legislation Atlas, available at: https://www.a-mla.org/en (last accessed 28 February 2025). The five most recent legislative changes are: Burkina Faso Mining Code 2024; Rwanda Mining Law 2024; Madagascar Mining Code 2024; Central African Republic Mining Code 2024; and Botswana Mines and Minerals Act (proposed amendments 2024).
[14] See, for example, Tanzania Mining (State Participation) Regulations 2022, Article 7(1).
[15] Democratic Republic of the Congo Mining Code 2002 (amended 2018), Articles 64 bis and 266.
[16] Democratic Republic of the Congo Mining Code 2002 (amended 2018), Article 241.
[17] Tanzania has adopted the Tanzania Mining Act in 2019 and a number of regulations concerning, inter alia, mineral rights (2020) and state participation (2020 and 2022); the DRC amended its Mining Code 2002 in 2018 (African Mining Legislation Atlas, available at: https://www.a-mla.org/en (last accessed 28 February 2025)).
[18] UNCTAD Investment Policy Hub, available at: https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/ (last accessed 5 March 2025); ICSID Cases Database, available at: https://icsid.worldbank.org/cases/case-database (last accessed 28 February 2025); Investment Arbitration Reporter, available at: https://www.iareporter.com/arbitration-cases/ (last accessed 5 March 2025).
[19] The different approach adopted by tribunals to this issue can be highlighted by a number of cases brought against Libya following the state’s introduction in 1973 of legislation that effectively nationalised foreign investments in the extractives industries. On the one hand, one tribunal determined that the application of the new legislation to the investment benefitting from a stabilisation clause under an investment contract was illegal (Texaco Overseas Oil Petroleum Co./ California Asiatic Oil Co. v. Government of the Libyan Arab Republic, Award on the Merits, 19 January 1977, 17 I.L.M. 1–37 (1978)). In contrast, another tribunal determined that the application of new legislation to an investment benefitting from a stabilisation clause was valid, but that the state was obliged to pay the investor compensation for the expropriation (Libyan American Oil Company v. The Government of the Libyan Arab Republic, Award, 12 April 1977, 20 I.L.M. 1 (1981)). A number of tribunals have since adopted the latter of these two approaches (see, for example, AGIP Company v. People’s Republic of the Congo, Award, 30 November 1979, 21 I.L.M. 726–739 (1982)).
[20] See, for example, Nachingwea U.K. Limited (UK), Ntaka Nickel Holdings Limited (UK) and Nachingwea Nickel Limited (Tanzania) v. Tanzania (ICSID Case No. ARB/20/38), Award, 14 July 2023 (para. 294) in which the tribunal determined that the state’s decision to revoke licences granting the investor rights to explore identified mineral resources at a later date constituted an unlawful expropriation under the Tanzania-United Kingdom BIT (1994). In contrast, some tribunals have dismissed claims by investors that revocation or non-renewal of a mining licence constitutes an expropriation for the purposes of an investment treaty protection. See, for example, Navodaya Trading DMCC v. Gabonese Republic (PCA Case No. 2018-23, Award, 2 December 2020), in which the tribunal held that the state’s refusal to renew a mining licence was justified in light of the investor’s non-performance, as was the transfer of the licence to a competitor; consequently, the state had not committed an expropriation.
[21] See, for example: European Commission, International Partnerships, Connecting the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Zambia, and Angola to Global Markets through the Lobito Corridor, available at: https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/policies/global-gateway/connecting-democratic-republic-congo-zambia-and-angola-global-markets-through-lobito-corridor_en; African Development Bank Group, East Africa: the Ethiopia-Kenya electricity highway is shaping regional connectivity with the support of the African Development Bank, 28 October 2024, available at:  https://www.afdb.org/en/success-stories/east-africa-ethiopia-kenya-electricity-highway-shaping-regional-connectivity-support-african-development-bank-76143#:~:text=This%20vision%20of%20a%20shared,the%20heart%20of%20the%20project; Nigeria Infrastructure Concession Regulatory Commission, Lekki Deep Water Port, available at: https://ppp.icrc.gov.ng/project/118.
[22] See, for example, the International Chamber of Commerce (“ICC“) Rules for Administration of Expert Proceedings, available at: https://iccwbo.org/dispute-resolution/dispute-resolution-services/adr/experts/.
[23] Singapore Convention on Mediation Website, available at: https://www.singaporeconvention.org/convention/text.
[24] ICSID website, Conciliation, available through the following link: https://icsid.worldbank.org/services/mediation-conciliation/conciliation/overview#:~:text=ICSID%20conciliation%20is%20a%20cooperative,agreement%20on%20mutually%20acceptable%20terms.
[25] Singapore Convention on Mediation Website, available at: https://www.singaporeconvention.org/convention/text.
The following African states have signed: Benin, Chad, Congo, the DRC, Eswatini, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritius, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Uganda (all signed in 2019).
[26] For example, Egypt has established a Ministerial Committee on Investment Dispute Resolution (UNCTAD Compendium of Investment Laws, Egypt, 2017, available at: google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&ved=2ahUKEwjT1M_h7JGMAxWLm_0HHVMsNmoQFnoECCoQAQ&url=https%3A%2F%2Finvestmentpolicy.unctad.org%2Finvestment-laws%2Flaws%2F167%2Fprint%2F3&usg=AOvVaw1lkuCl_TjQbvQy-ZIw8RBy&opi=89978449); the Ethiopia Investment Commission has established an Investment Grievance Management Procedure (Tsegamlak Solomon, A Small but Important Step in Ethiopia’s Relationship with its Growing Private Sector, Renew Capital, 5 January 2021, available at: https://www.renewcapital.com/newsroom/a-small-but-important-step-in-ethiopias-relationship-with-its-growing-private-sector); and the Rwanda Development Board has established a Reinvestment and Aftercare Department (Rwanda Global Business Services Growth Initiative, Rwanda GBS Investor Playbook 2024, p. 4 available at: https://rwanda.gbs.rw/uploads/Rwanda_GBS_Growth_Initiative_Investor_Handbook_V4_30052024_702fc174f3.pdf).
[27] UNCTAD Investment Policy Hub, available at: https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/ (last accessed 5 March 2025).

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